Constitutional Law - Commerce Clause - Federal Jurisdiction in Trade-Mark Infringement Proceedings Under the Lanham Act by Dailey, Richard R.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 53 Issue 5 
1955 
Constitutional Law - Commerce Clause - Federal Jurisdiction in 
Trade-Mark Infringement Proceedings Under the Lanham Act 
Richard R. Dailey 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law 
Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard R. Dailey, Constitutional Law - Commerce Clause - Federal Jurisdiction in Trade-Mark 
Infringement Proceedings Under the Lanham Act, 53 MICH. L. REV. 745 (1955). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol53/iss5/6 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1955] RECENT DECISIONS 745 
RECENT DECISIONS 
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw - CoMMBRCE CLAUSE - FEDERAL JurusmCTioN IN 
TRADE-MARK lNFruNGEMEN'l' PnoCEEDINGs UNDER THE LANHAM Acr-
Plaintiff's trade-mark, "Minute Maid," had been registered under the Lanham 
Act1 in 1952 and had been used in interstate commerce in connection with the 
sale of frozen fruit juice concentrates since that time. Defendant's trade-mark 
consisted in part of the words "Minute Made." Defendant used its mark wholly 
within the State of Florida in the processing and sale of frozen meat products. 
Both plaintiff and defendant were Florida corporations. In a suit for trade-mark 
infringement, jurisdiction of the federal district court depended. on the provi-
sions of the Lanham Act.2 The complaint alleged damage to plaintiff's good will 
established in interstate commerce. The Lanham Act grants jurisdiction to the 
federal courts in suits for trade-mark infringement where the defendant has used 
the infringing mark "in commerce.''3 The district court enjoined the defend-
ant's use of the words "Minute Made.'' On appeal, the defendant challenged 
the jurisdiction of the district court on the ground that the pleadings and proof 
did not establish that the alleged infringing mark had been used "in commerce" 
within the meaning of the Lanham Act. Held, affirmed. The complaint which 
alleged damage to plaintiff's "good will established in interstate commerce" was 
sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court. Pure Foods, Inc. v. 
Minute Maid Corp., (5th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 792. 
The first effective federal trade-mark legislation, enacted in 1905, provided 
for the registration of trade-marks, and granted jurisdiction to the federal courts 
in suits for infringement of a registered mark.4 Decisions under this statute 
established two propositions: first, that the effect of trade-marks on interstate 
commerce was sufficient to regard them as instrumentalities or agencies of inter-
state commerce;5 and, second, that the power granted to Congress under the 
commerce clause was the only constitutional authorization for federal trade-mark 
legislation.6 Liability under the 1905 statute was limited to cases where the 
160 Stat. L. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1051. 
2 60 Stat. L. 440, §34 (1946), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §ll21: "The district and territorial 
courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction ••• of all actions arising under 
this chapter, without regard to the amount in controversy or to diversity or lack of diversity 
of the citizenship of the parties." 
860 Stat. L. 437, §32 (1946), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §lll4. 
4 33 Stat. L. 724, §592 (1905). The earliest federal trade-mark registration was 
enacted in 1870 (16 Stat. L. 198). In 1876 criminal sanctions were added (19 Stat. L. 
141). This legislation was declared unconstitutional in The Trade Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 
82 (1879), on the ground that the authority granted by the eighth clause of U.S. CONST., 
art. I, §8 (patents and copyrights) did not extend to trade-marks. The court refused to 
consider the question of whether a trade-mark bears such a relation to commerce as to allow 
regulation by Congress even in the sphere of interstate commerce. A later statute, 21 Stat. 
L. 502 (1881), was limited to foreign commerce. 
5 The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on this point. But see Philco Corp. v. 
Phillip's Mfg. Co., (7th Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 663, and cases there cited. 
G United States Printing & Lithograph Co. v. Griggs, Cooper & Co., 279 U.S. 156, 
49 S.Ct. 267 (1929); Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C. I. Lee & Co., (2d Cir. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 
103; Horlick's Malted Milk Corp. v. Horluck's, Inc., (9th Cir. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 13. 
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infringing mark was used "in commerce among the several States, or with a 
foreign nation, or with the Indian tribes."7 In general, as to what activities were 
within the meaning of the commerce clause, decisions under the 1905 act paral-
leled the decisions in other fields in the process of widening the area of federal 
control under the commerce clause. Confusion arose with announcement of 
the doctrine that any intrastate activity which had a "substantial economic effect" 
on interstate commerce was subject to the regulation of Congress.8 To clarify the 
extent of federal control in the field of trade-marks, the Lanham Act of 1946 
provided that the infringing mark must be used "in commerce," and then defined 
commerce to mean "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Con-
gress."9 Initially, it is difficult to see that this change in statutory language 
enlarged the protection afforded registered trade-marks.10 The decisions under 
the Lanham Act indicate, however, that this change in language has been inter-
preted by the courts as legislative approval of the "substantial economic effect" 
doctrine.11 A trade-mark is a property right and is inseparable from the good 
will of the owner.12 Infringement of a trade-mark used in interstate commerce 
necessarily affects that commerce to some extent, the question in each case 
being whether the effect is substantial. For jurisdictional purposes, the amount 
in controversy in infringement suits is taken to be the value of the plaintiff's 
good will.13 Although the Lanham Act grants jurisdiction over infringement 
suits to federal courts regardless of diversity of citizenship or the amount in 
controversy,14 the above method of computing the amount in controversy indi-
cates that the effect of trade-mark infringement will in each case be substantial.15 
The conclusion required by decisions such as the present case under the Lanham 
Act is that the federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain all suits for infringe-
ment of a trade-mark registered under the act regardless of the intrastate or 
interstate character of the defendant's business. Intrastate enterprises, normally 
not subject to the regulation of Congress, become so when their activity infringes 
a federally registered trade-mark.16 In form the federal courts still require that 
7 33 Stat. L. 728, §16 (1905). Cases interpreting this section of the 1905 statute are 
collected in 2 N1Ms, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKs, 4th ed., §311, p. 1000 
(1947). 
SWickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill, 63 S.Ct. 82 (1942); Barnett, "Ten Years of the 
Supreme Court: 1937-1947-Power to Regulate Commerce," 41 AM.. PoL. Ser. REv. 1170 
(1947). 
9 60 Stat. L. 443, §45 (1946), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1127. 
10 This is so since Congress may lawfully regulate only that commerce which was 
specified under the 1905 statute (note 7 supra). 
11 Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, (5th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 567; Robert, "Commen-
tary on The Lanham Trade-Mark Act," 15 U.S.C.A. (1948) preceding §1051. 
12 Griesedieck Western Brewery Co. v. Peoples Brewing Co., (8th Cir. 1945) 149 F. 
(2d) 1019. 
13 2 NIMs, UNFAIR CoMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKs, 4th ed., §363, p. 1121 (1947). 
14 See note 2 supra. 
15 This will be the case unless plaintiff's good will established in interstate commerce 
is not substantial; the related problem of whether under this circumstance he may lawfully 
be protected at all by federal legislation is beyond the scope of this note. 
16 This conclusion is in line with decisions of the federal courts expanding federal 
control in other fields of legislation under the commerce clause. See note 8 supra. 
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the complaint allege that the defendant is using the infringing mark "in com-
merce." In substance, however, the necessary jurisdictional requirements are 
established by an allegation that the defendant has infringed a federally regis-
tered trade-mark. The act of infringing a trade-mark registered under the 
Lanham Act in itself satisfies the jurisdictional requirement; the statutory re-
quirement that the infringing mark be used "in commerce" has become super-
fluous. 
Richard R. Dailey 
